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This paper reports an experimental study on three well known solutions for bankruptcy 
problems, that is, the constrained equal-awards, the proportional and the constrained 
equal-losses rule. To do this, we first let subjects play three games designed such that the 
unique equilibrium outcome coincides with one of these three rules. Moreover, we also 
let subjects play an additional game, that has the property that all (and only) strategy 
profiles in which players unanimously agree on the same rule constitute a strict Nash 
equilibrium. While in the first three games subjects' play easily converges to the unique 






When a ﬁrm goes bankrupt, how should its liquidation value be divided
among its creditors? Previous question is an example of the so called bankruptcy
problems, which provide with a simple framework to study ways of distribut-
ing losses when agents’ claims cannot be fully satisﬁed.
This is a major practical issue and, as such, it has a long history. From
the way of solving some practical cases, researches moved in the direction of
searching for well-behaved methods or rules to solve families of bankruptcy
problems. The best-known rule is the proportional rule, which recommends
awards to be proportional to claims. In the case of shareholders of a ﬁrm, the
idea behind the proportional rule is natural: each share is awarded equally.
The idea of equality underlies another well-known rule: the constrained equal-
awards rule. It makes awards as equal as possible to all creditors, subject
to the condition that no creditor receives more than her claim. A dual
formulation of equality, focusing on the losses creditors incur, as opposed
to what they receive, underlies the constrained equal-losses rule.I tp r o p o s e s
losses as equal as possible for all creditors, subject to the condition that no
creditor ends up with a negative award. The constrained equal awards rule
gives priority to agents with small claims. They are reimbursed relatively
more than agents with larger claims. It seems a natural procedure to apply
when creditors claims are correlated with their incomes. On the contrary,
the constrained equal-losses rule gives priority to agents with large claims.
They start receiving money before agents with small claims, that are only
reimbursed once the loss they experience is larger than the losses experienced
by agents with larger claims. It is a natural procedure to be applied when
claims are related to needs, as for example when we think of public support
of health care expenses.
The behavior of the diﬀerent rules comes from the properties those rules
fulﬁll. The analysis and formulation of properties, and the search for combi-
nation of properties characterizing a single rule, is the object of an important
branch of the bankruptcy literature: the so called axiomatic approach. The
proportional, constrained equal-awards and constrained equal-losses rules
satisfy many basic properties. Looking specially to those three solutions
is by no means arbitrary. First because they are among the most common
methods of solving practical problems. Second for their long tradition in
history. And last but not least, because they are almost the only sensible
3ones within the family of solutions that treat equally equal claims.1
Another approach to bankruptcy is the game theoretical, in which bankruptcy
problems are formulated either as TU coalitional games, or as bargaining
problems, and rules are derived from solutions to coalitional games and from
bargaining solutions, respectively.2 The axiomatic, as well as the game-
theoretic approach share a common view in the analysis of bankruptcy prob-
lems: they look at the fairness and cooperative aspect in order to support
certain bankruptcy rules.
Bankruptcy problems have also been addressed from a noncooperative
viewpoint in a limited number of papers.3 These papers apply to bankruptcy
the same methodology known as the Nash program for the theory of bar-
gaining, that is, they construct speciﬁc procedures as noncooperative games
which have the property that the unique equilibrium outcome corresponds to
a speciﬁcb a n k r u p t c yr u l e . 4 In other words, this literature provides theoret-
ical support to bankruptcy rules by constructing speciﬁc strategic situations
for which these rules are self-enforcing.
There is another aspect which makes this noncooperative approach inter-
esting for bankruptcy theory. As it happens for bargaining theory, research
is far from unanimous in identifying a unique optimal solution to bankruptcy
problems. In consequence, there are many situations in which a judge, or the
outside authority in charge to design the procedure to solve a bankruptcy
problem, may not have strict preferences, a priori, on which rule should be
implemented for the problem at stake. Under these circumstances, the judge
may resort to a (noncooperative) procedure which may lead to alternative
rules as the outcome of strategic interaction among the claimants.
The aim of this paper is to bring these interesting matters for social
choice theory into an experimental lab. To do so, we ﬁrst investigate sub-
jects’ behavior playing the (noncooperative) procedures of Chun (1989), Her-
rero (2001) and Moreno-Ternero (2002). To keep things simple, subjects
could only choose among the constrained equal awards, constrained equal
losses and proportional rules. We focus on these three procedures because
they share the same game-form (claimants are required, simultaneously, to
1See Moulin (2000) and Herrero and Villar (2001).
2Instances of this approach are the papers of O’Neill (1982), Aumann and Maschler
(1985), Curiel, Maschler and Tijs (1988) and Dagan and Volij (1993).
3See Chun (1989), Dagan, Serrano and Volij (1997), Herrero (2001), and Moreno-
Ternero (2002).
4See Nash (1953), Binmore et al. (1992), or Roemer (1996) among others.
4propose a rule) and because they display very similar strategic properties
(namely, there is always a player with a dominant strategy by which she can
force the outcome of the game in her favor). These appear very mild (ﬁrst-
order) rationality conditions that may obscure non-cooperative ﬂavor of this
approach. If subjects recognize the strategic incentive structure induced by
each game, then choosing a particular procedure may be equivalent to choose
ap a r t i c u l a rr u l et os o l v et h ep r o b l e m .T h i si sw h yw ea l s oc o n s i d e ra na d d i -
tional procedure (a coordination game) that has the property that all (and
only) strategy proﬁles in which players unanimously agree on the same rule
constitute a strict Nash equilibrium. This additional game has no selection
incentives, but coordination incentives only. Thus, we can use this game to
investigate, in a more compelling way, the rule selection problem.
Finally, we also want to investigate the matters above from a diﬀerent
perspective. As we mentioned earlier, diﬀerent rules are to be considered
more appropriate depending on the bankruptcy problem at stake. There-
fore, it may be interesting to provide the “same” bankruptcy problem with
alternative contexts to see whether diﬀerent frames may induce subjects to
behave diﬀerently. We also want to test a completely “unframed” scenario,
where only monetary payoﬀs associated to strategy proﬁles are provided.
Our experimental study yields the following conclusions. While in the ﬁrst
three procedures subjects’ play easily converges to the unique equilibrium rule
even in the ﬁrst repetitions, in the coordination procedure the proportional
rule overwhelmingly prevails as a coordination device. As for the framing
issue, we ﬁnd that frames have some impact on subjects’ behavior only in
the ﬁrst repetitions of the game. As time proceeds, strategic considerations
appear more compelling in explaining subjects’ behavior.
This is, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst experiment on bankruptcy
games. The closest reference to our work is the paper of Cuadras-Morató et
al. (2001). They investigate, by way of questionnaires, the equity properties
of diﬀerent bankruptcy rules in the context of health care problems.5 In this
respect, they ﬁnd that, when asked to choose among six potential allocations
(including the proportional and the constrained equal losses rule) using the
perspective on an “impartial judge” in the context of health care problems,
subjects display a slight preference for the constrained equal losses solution.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
formally introduce bankruptcy problems, the three rules, and the noncoop-
5See also Yaari and Bar-Hilel (1984).
5erative procedures object of our experiment. Section 3 is devoted to the
experimental design. In Section 4, we report the experimental results. Con-
clusions, comments and further proposals are presented in Section 5. An
Appendix contains the experimental instructions.
2 Bankruptcy problems, rules and procedures
Let N = {1,2,..., n} be a set of agents with generic elements i and j.A




i∈N ci >E>0. In words, ci is the claim of agent i over an estate E.
Let B denote the class of such problems.
A rule is a mapping r : B → R
n that associates to every problem (c,E)
a unique allocation r(c,E) ∈ Rn such that:




(iii) For all i,j ∈ N,i fci ≥ cj then ri(c,E) ≥ rj(c,E) and ci − cj ≥
ri(c,E) − rj(c,E).
The allocation r(c,E) is interpreted as a desirable way of dividing E
among the agents in N.R e q u i r e m e n t (i) is that each agent receives an
award that is non-negative and bounded above by her claim. Requirement
(ii) i st h a tt h ee n t i r ee s t a t em u s tb ea l l o c a t e d .F i n a l l y ,r e q u i r e m e n t(iii) is
that agents with higher claims receive higher awards and face higher losses.
Let R denote the set of all such rules.
Next, we introduce three well-known rules focus of our experiment.
• RULE “cea”: Constrained equal-awards. For all (c,E) ∈ B and
all i ∈ N,ceai(c,E)=m i n {ci,λ}, where λ solves
S
i∈N min{ci,λ} = E.
• RULE “p”: Proportional. For all (c,E) ∈ B and all i ∈ N,pi(c,E)=
λci,w h e r eλ solves
S
i∈N λci = E.
• RULE “cel”: Constrained equal-losses. For all (c,E) ∈ B and all
i ∈ N,celi(c,E)=m a x {0,c i−λ}, where λ solves
S
i∈N max{0,c i−λ} =
E.
6The constrained equal-awards rule makes awards as equal as possible,
subject to no agent receiving more than her claim. The proportional rule
distributes awards proportionally to claims. The constrained equal-losses
rule makes losses as equal as possible, subject to the condition that no agent
ends up with a negative award.
Remark 1 Note that for all (c,E) ∈ B and all r ∈ R,i fci =m a x N ck and
cj =m i n N ck,t h e nceli(c,E) ≥ ri(c,E) and ceaj(c,E) ≥ rj(c,E).I no t h e r
words, cel (cea) is the most preferred rule by the highest (lowest) claimant
among all rules belonging to R.
There has been a wide research about bankruptcy rules under an ax-
iomatic perspective. The three rules presented above satisfy many appealing
properties, have a long history of use, and share many common sense equity
principles. Thus, it is agreed that they somehow constitute the central group
of bankruptcy rules. This may induce a social planner to prefer these rules
to other alternatives. On the other hand, like for bargaining problems, the
literature seems far from unanimous in proposing au n i q u eoptimal solution
to bankruptcy problems relying on axiomatic properties only. This opens the
possibility of approaching bankruptcy problems using alternative techniques.
2.1 Noncooperative solutions to bankruptcy problems
As we mentioned earlier, our experiment is concerned with some noncoopera-
tive procedures proposed to solve bankruptcy problems. All these procedures
have the same game-form. Agents simultaneously propose a rule belonging
to the set R, and the procedure selects a particular division of the estate
accordingly.
Diminishing claims procedure (P1) [Chun (1989)]. Let (c,E) ∈ B be
given. Each agent chooses a rule rj ∈ R.L e tr =( rj)n
j=1 be the proﬁle of
rules reported. The division proposed by the diminishing claims procedure,
dc[r,(c,E)] is obtained as follows:
Step 1. Let c1 = c. For all j ∈ N, calculate rj(c1,E) ∈ R(c1,E). If all
coincide, then, dc[r,(c,E)] = rj(c1,E). Otherwise, go to the next step.
Step 2. For all i ∈ N,l e tc2
i =m a x j∈N r
j
i(c1,E).F o ra l lj ∈ N, calculate
rj(c2,E). If all coincide, then dc[r,(c,E)] = rj(c2,E). Otherwise, go to the
next step.
7Step k+1. For all i ∈ N,l e tc
k+1
i =m a x j∈N r
j
i(ck,E). For all j ∈ N, cal-
culate rj(ck+1,E). If all coincide, then dc[r,(c,E)] = rj(ck+1,E). Otherwise,
go to the next step.
If previous process does not terminate in a ﬁnite number of steps, then:
Limit case.C o m p u t e limt→∞ ct. If it converges to an allocation x such
that
S
i∈N xi ≤ E, then x = dc[r,(c,E)]. Otherwise, dc[r,(c,E)] = 0.
In the diminishing claims procedure, once agents have selected a rule,
agents’ claims are sequentially reduced by substituting them with the highest
amount assigned to every agent by the chosen rules. If the process converges
to a feasible allocation, then this limit is chosen as solution to the problem.
Otherwise, nobody gets anything.
Proportional concessions procedure (P2) [Moreno-Ternero (2002)]. Let
(c,E) ∈ B be given. Each agent chooses a rule rj ∈ R.L e t r =( rj)n
j=1
be the proﬁle of rules reported. The division proposed by the proportional
concessions procedure, pc[r,(c,E)], is obtained as follows:
Step 1. Let c1 = c and E1 = E.F o ra l lj ∈ N, calculate rj(c1,E1). If all
of them coincide, then, pc[r,(c,E)] = rj(c1,E1). Otherwise, go to the next
step.
Step 2. For all i ∈ N,l e tm1
i = pi(c1, E1





2.F o ra l lj ∈ N,c a l c u l a t erj(c2,E2). If all of them coincide,
then pc[r(c,E)] = m1 + rj(c2,E2). Otherwise, go to the next step.
Step k+1. For all i ∈ N,l e tmk
i = pi(ck, Ek
2 ), ck+1 = ck − mk,a n d




2k.F o ra l lj ∈ N,c a l c u l a t erj(ck+1,Ek+1).I f a l lo f
them coincide, then pc[r,(c,E)] = m1+···+mk+rj(ck+1,Ek+1). Otherwise,
go to the next step.
If previous process does not terminate in a ﬁnite number of steps, then:
Limit case.C o m p u t elimk→∞(m1+···+mk). If it converges to an alloca-
tion x such that
S
xi ≤ E,then x = pc[r,(c,E)]. Otherwise, pc[r,(c,E)] = 0.
In the proportional concessions procedure, once agents have selected a
rule, they sequentially receive the share proposed by the proportional rule
to the resulting bankruptcy problem after reducing the estate to half of it.
If the process converges to a feasible allocation, then this limit is chosen as
solution to the problem. Otherwise, nobody gets anything.
Unanimous concessions procedure (P3) [Herrero (2001)]. Let (c,E) ∈
B be given. Each agent chooses a rule rj ∈ R.L e t r =( rj)n
j=1 be the
8proﬁle of rules reported. The division proposed by the unanimous concessions
procedure, u[r,(c,E)] is obtained as follows:
Step 1. Let c1 = c and E1 = E.F o ra l lj ∈ N, calculate rj(c1,E1). If all
of them coincide, then, u[r,(c,E)] = rj(c1,E1). Otherwise, go to the next
step.
Step 2. For all i ∈ N,l e tm1
i =m i n j∈N r
j




and c2 = c1 − m1,w h e r em1 =( m1
i)i∈N For all j ∈ N, calculate rj(c2,E2).
If all of them coincide, then u[r,(c,E)] = m1 + rj(c2,E2). Otherwise, go to
the next step.
Step k+1. For all i ∈ N,l e tmk
i =m i n j∈N r
j
i(ck,Ek), Ek+1 = Ek − S
i∈N mk
i,a n dck+1 = ck − mk.F o ra l lj ∈ N, calculate rj(ck+1,Ek+1). If all
of them coincide, then u[r,(c,E)] = m1+···+mk+rj(ck+1,Ek+1). Otherwise,
go to the next step.
If previous process does not terminate in a ﬁnite number of steps, then
Limit case.C o m p u t e limk→∞(m1 + ···+ mk). If it converges to an
allocation x such that
S
i∈N xi ≤ E, then x = u[r,(c,E)]. Otherwise,
u[r,(c,E)] = 0.
In the unanimous concessions procedure, once agents have selected a rule,
agents’ claim are sequentially reduced by the minimum amount assigned by
the chosen rules. If the process converges, then this allocation is chosen as
the solution to the conﬂict. Otherwise, nobody gets anything.
The strategic properties of these procedures have already been explored
by the literature, as the following lemmas show.
Lemma 1 If, for some i ∈ N, ri = cea,t h e ndc[r,(c,E)] = cea(c,E).
Furthermore, in game P1,c e ais a weakly dominant strategy for the smallest
claimant. All Nash equilibria of P1 are outcome equivalent to cea.
Proof. See Chun (1989).
Lemma 2 If, for some i ∈ N, ri = p,t h e npc[r,(c,E)] = p(c,E).F u r t h e r -
more, in game P2, if there exists an agent whose preferred allocation is p,
then p is a weakly dominant strategy for her. All Nash equilibria of P2 are
outcome equivalent to p.
Proof. See Moreno-Ternero (2002).
9Lemma 3 If, for some i ∈ N, ri = cel,t h e nu[r,(c,E)] = cel(c,E).F u r -
thermore, in game P3,c e lis a weakly dominant strategy for the highest
claimant. All Nash equilibria of P3 are outcome equivalent to cel.
Proof. See Herrero (2001).
As shown in the lemmas, these procedures do not seem to provide the
agents with any freedom of choice, at least under very mild (ﬁrst-order)
rationality conditions. This is because, there is always some player (the
identity of which depends on the procedure) who can force the outcome in
her favor by selecting her weakly dominant strategy. This may render these
procedures inadequate, if we were genuinely interested in the rule selection
problem, that is, in collecting experimental evidence on how subject reach an
agreement on bankruptcy problems in the lab. This is why we also consider
an additional procedure by way of the following coordination game.
Majority procedure (P0). Let (c,E) ∈ B be given. Each agent i ∈ N,









i (c,E) if ri is the (single) majority rule.
−ε otherwise.
In the majority procedure, a claimant obtains the share of the estate
proposed by her chosen rule only if it has been selected by the majority.
Otherwise, she is ﬁned by ε > 0. The strategic properties of this procedure
are contained in the following lemma, the (trivial) proof of which is here
omitted.
Lemma 4 The set of strict Nash equilibria of P0 is {(r,r,...,r):r ∈ R}.
3 Experimental design
In what follows, we describe the features of the experiments in detail.
Subjects. The experiment was conducted in eight subsequent sessions in
July, 2001. A total of 84 students (12 per session) were recruited among the
undergraduate population of the University of Alicante.6 Each session lasted
for approximately one hour.
6Mainly, undergraduate Economics students with no (or very limited) prior exposure
to game theory.
10Treatment. The eight experimental sessions were run in a computer lab.7
In the ﬁrst six sessions, subjects were assigned to a group of 3 individuals
a n dp l a y e dt w e n t yr o u n d so faframed procedure,8 P1, P2 or P3,f o l l o w e d
by twenty rounds of P0, presented under the same frame. In the last two
sessions, subjects played twenty rounds of each of the four procedures, P1,
P2, P3 and P0, without any framework.9 As a consequence, these last two
sessions were longer and subjects received higher monetary rewards. In all
sessions, subjects played anonymously with varying opponents. Subjects
were informed that their player position (i.e., their individual claims in the
bankruptcy problem) would remain the same throughout the experiment,
while the composition of their group would change at every round.
Instructions were provided by a self-paced, interactive computer program
that introduced and described the experiment. Subjects were also given a
written copy of the experimental instructions.10 At the end of each round,
each player knew about the game outcome and the monetary payoﬀ associ-
ated with it.
The bankruptcy problem. All experimental games were constructed upon the
same bankruptcy problem, where c∗ =( 4 9 , 46, 5) (i.e.,
S
ci =1 0 0 )and
E =2 0 .11 The resulting allocations associated with each rule for this speciﬁc
bankruptcy problem are the following:
cel(E,c





We decided to focus on this particular problem for the following reasons. Ide-
ally, we were looking for a problem satisfying the following three conditions.
1. Since cel is strictly preferred by player 1 (i.e., the highest claimant)
7The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fis-
chbacher, 1999).
8See subsection Framework below.
9More precisely, the ﬁrst and the fourth session involved P1, followed by P0.T h e
second, and the ﬁfth session involved P2, followed by P0. The third and the sixth session
involved P3, followed by P0. Finally, the seventh session involved P1,f o l l o w e db yP2,
followed by P3, and followed by P0, without any framework. The eighth session, involved
P3, followed by P2, followed by P1, and followed by P0, without any framework.
10The complete set of instructions can be found in Appendix.
11All monetary payoﬀ are expressed in Spanish pesetas (1 euro=166 pesetas approxi-
mately).
11and cea is strictly preferred by player 3 (the lowest claimant), our ﬁrst
requirement was to impose that player 2 would strictly prefer p.I n
other words,
p2 > max{cel2,c e a 2}.
2. We were also looking for a bankruptcy problem for which the three
rules would always give positive quantities to all claimants. This is
always true for cea and p but not for cel.T h u s ,w er e q u i r e d
cel(c,E) > 0.
3. Finally, we tried to ensure that each claimant would get diﬀerent quan-
tities. Combined with condition 2, this implies
ceaj  = ceai for all i  = j.
As it turns out, the three conditions above are incompatible. Therefore,
we relaxed condition 3 to allow for at most two players receiving the same
amount, and condition 2 to allow the third claimant to get a null amount.
As a result, we have the bankruptcy problem presented above.
The games. All experimental treatments had the same game-form. In each
session, each player was assigned to a player position, corresponding to a
particular claim in the bankruptcy problem above, with c∗
i denoting player
i’s claim. In each round, each player was required to choose simultaneously
a rule among cea, p and cel. Round payoﬀsw e r ed e t e r m i n e db yt h er u l i n g
procedure.
Payoﬀs. To frame the situation as closest as possible to a bankruptcy prob-
lem, in each round, subjects were loosing the diﬀerence between their claim
and the share of the estate’s division assigned to them, given the ruling pro-
cedure and the group’s strategy proﬁle. These amounts were subtracted to
subjects’ endowments. All subjects selected as players 1 and 2 received 500
pesetas to show up, in the framed sessions, and 1000 pesetas in the unframed
sessions. Subjects selected as players 3 did not receive an initial show-up fee,
due to the fact that their losses were considerably lower than the others’.
Moreover, in each of the two procedures that constitutes a framed session,
each player received an initial endowment of 1000 pesetas from which it was
subtracted the associated loss to each bankruptcy situation. In procedure P0,
the penalty ε was equal to 1 peseta in all payoﬀ treatments. Average earnings
12were around 1800 pesetas for players 1 and 2 (including the participation fee)
and around 3600 pesetas for player 3.
Group size. Our decision to focus on a bankruptcy problem with three players
was dictated by several reasons. The procedures presented in Section 2 (as
opposite with some bargaining procedures of a related nature), work for any
number of agents. Furthermore, the situation is radically diﬀerent when more
t h a nt w oa g e n t sa r ei n v o l v e dt h a ni nt h et w o - a g e n tc a s e .T h a ti s ,t h er e a s o n
of choosing three agents, as a way of moving away from the two-person case,
but keeping the population size at a minimum. Second, on the fact that in
our case, each one of the proposed solutions provides with the best outcome
to one of the players. It is always true that the smallest claimant will prefer
the cea rule, and the largest claimant will prefer the cel rule. Nonetheless,
it is not always the case that any intermediate claimant will prefer p over
the other two rules. In any case, we choose this type of situation in order
to keep any of the rules attached to any of the agents, and to avoid obvious
solutions to the coordination game. Third, on the fact that we made agents
to play a single bankruptcy problem. We think that this example is enough
to give us the ﬂavor of the way agents will play at any other circumstances,
and keeping a single example facilitates learning and comprehension by the
players.
Framework. In the ﬁrst six sessions the bankruptcy problem were framed in
three diﬀerent ways, depending on the procedure being employed. The idea
is to provide a frame consistent with the rule induced by the procedure.12
All frames had in common that the bankruptcy problem was framed in
terms of a bank which goes bankrupt.
• Frame 1: Depositors (P1).I nt h i sﬁrst frame claimants are all bank
depositors. In our interpretation, this is a situation where the priority
should go to smaller claims (i.e., smaller deposits), as it happens with
procedure P1.
• Frame 2 : Shareholders (P2). Under this frame claimants are all
bank shareholders. In this case, it seems to be commonly agreed that
claims should be treated proportionally, as P2 does.
• Frame 3 : Non-governmental organizations (P3).O u rl a s tf r a m e
is concerned with non-governmental organizations which are supported
12A precise description of the hypothetical situations used as frames can be found in the
Appendix.
13by the bank. In this case, we assumed that each organization had signed
a contract with the bank, previously to the bankruptcy situation, to
receive a contribution according with its social relevance (the higher the
social relevance, the higher the contribution). Under this framework,
it would seem appropriate to use the constrained equal-losses rule, as
P3 does.
• Frame 0: No frame. We also run two unframed sessions. In this
case, individuals played the four games without any story behind.
4 Results
In analyzing the experimental data, we ﬁrst look at the rule distributions
and subjects’ aggregate behavior in the six framed sessions. Later, we also
compare the experimental evidence between framed and unframed sessions.
4.1 Outcomes and behaviors in the framed sessions
Relative frequencies with which the three bankruptcy rules were implemented
in the six framed sessions of P1, P2 and P3 are summarized in Table 1.13
RULES
PROCEDURES cea p cel Others
P1 .98 0 0 .02
P2 0 1 0 0
P3 0 0 .98 .02
(1)
Table 1: Rule distributions of P1,P 2 and P3 in the framed sessions.
We begin by noting that, in the framed sessions, virtually all matches yielded
the corresponding equilibrium rule.14 This striking evidence has to be com-
pared with the rule distribution in the framed versions of the coordination
13In all tables, frequencies were rounded to the nearest .01.
14The relative frequency of equilibrium outcomes converges to 1, for all procedures, if we
look at the last ten repetitions only. We also know that every Nash equilibrium is outcome
equivalent to the corresponding rule of that procedure. However there are strategy proﬁles
which are outcome equivalent to the equilibrium rule but are not Nash equilibria. In this
respect, our experiment shows that these strategy proﬁles occur only marginally. If a
particular rule is selected, this is because it is a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding
procedure.
14procedure P0, as shown in Table 2.
OUTCOMES
FRAMES cea p cel Others
1 .01 .82 0 .17
2 0 .69 .01 .30
3 0 .75 .01 .24
(2)
Table 2: Rule distributions of P0, in the framed sessions.
Table 2 displays a completely diﬀerent scenario. Here the proportional rule
is salient in describing the outcome allocation in all sessions, with an average
frequency of .75 across all treatments. Not surprisingly, learning eﬀects are
much stronger in P0 than in any other procedure. The average frequency of
use of the proportional rule raises from .75 to .9 if we consider the last ten
periods only.15
We now move to subjects’ behavior, disaggregated for player position,
in the six framed sessions. As we know from Lemmas 1-3, every procedure
provides a player (the identity of which depends on the procedure) with a
weakly dominant strategy by which she can force her favorite outcome. In
each game, we will refer to this player as the pivotal player of that game.
However, given the reduced form games used in the experiment (subjects
could only choose among cea, p and cel), other players have weakly dominant
strategies, as follows:
• P1: cea is weakly dominant for the pivotal player 3; player 2 has no
weakly dominant strategies in this game; cel is weakly dominant for
player 1.
• P2: p is weakly dominant for the pivotal player 2; cea is weakly domi-
n a n tf o rp l a y e r3 ;cel is weakly dominant for player 1.
• P3: cel is weakly dominant for the pivotal player 1; cea is weakly
d o m i n a n tf o rp l a y e r3 ;p l a y e r2h a sn ow e a k l yd o m i n a n ts t r a t e g i e si n
this game.
To summarize, cea (cel) always corresponds to a weakly dominant strat-
egy for player 3 (1), while player 2 has a weakly dominant strategy (p)o n l yi n
15Tables data disaggregated for periods can be found in the Appendix.
15P2. This fact has clear consequences when we look at the aggregate behavior
of P1, P2 and P3 in the six framed sessions. This is shown in Table 3.
PLAYERS P1 P2 P3
1 .08 .28 .64 .02 .22 .76 .02 .06 .92
2 .15 .66 .19 .07 .76 .17 .06 .45 .49
3 .97 .02 .01 .82 .14 .04 .54 .3 .16
RULES cea p cel cea p cel cea p cel
(3)
Table 3: Aggregate behavior in the framed sessions of P1,P 2 and P3.
Here we notice that the pivotal player 3 selects her weakly dominant
strategy (A) in P1 with a relative frequency of .97 (this frequency raises to 1
if we only consider the last ten repetitions); in P3 the pivotal player 1 selects
her weakly dominant strategy (cel) 92% of the times (96.25% if we consider
the last ten periods); in P2 the relative frequency with which the pivotal
player 2 selects her weakly dominant strategy p is somehow lower (75.62%
and 77.5% resp.), but still signiﬁcantly higher than any other available choice.
As far as the weakly dominant strategy used by “non-pivotal” players, we
also notice that, although not as frequently as pivotal players, the weakly
dominant action is selected always more than 50% of the times.16
Again, things change signiﬁcantly if we look at the aggregate behavior in
the framed sessions of P0,a ss h o w ni nT a b l e4.
PLAYERS FRAME 1 FRAME 2 FRAME 3
1 .01 .95 .04 0 .81 .19 .02 .88 .10
2 .04 .93 .03 .02 .86 .12 .04 .92 .04
3 .12 .88 0 .07 .87 .06 .08 .9 .02
RULES cea p cel cea p cel cea p cel
(4)
Table 4: Aggregate behavior in the framed sessions of P0.
As Table 4 shows, subjects selected the proportional rule at least 80% of the
times. This probability raises to over 90% if we only consider the last ten
repetitions.
16More precisely, Player 1 chooses cel 64% and 76% of the times in P1 and P2, respec-
tively. These frequencies raise to 65% and 84% in the last ten periods. Player 3 chooses
cea, 82% and 54% of the times in P2 and P3, respectively. These frequencies raise to 84%
and 54% in the last ten periods.
164.2 Framed Vs. Unframed sessions
The rule distribution for the two unframed sessions, is summarized in Table
5.
RULES
PROCEDURES cea p cel Others
P0 .01 .71 0 .28
P1 .99 0 .01 0
P2 0 1 0 0
P3 0 0 .99 .01
(5)
Table 5: Rule distributions in the unframed sessions.
Not diﬀerently than what happens in the framed sessions, the three pro-
cedures implemented the corresponding equilibrium rule virtually in every
match. About P0, again the proportional rule is salient in describing the rule
distribution in all sessions. The average frequency of use is 71% across all
treatments, 97% if we consider the last ten periods only.
We can observe from Tables 1 and 5 that, for P2, rule distributions are
identical, insofar the proportional rule was implemented all the time. As
for P1 and P3,t h ed i ﬀerence between framed and unframed treatment is
statistically signiﬁcant at a 10% conﬁdence level.17 However, if we focus on
the last ten repetitions, diﬀerence in behavior is no longer signiﬁcant.
As for P0, remember that we have three diﬀerent framed versions, since
P0 w a sp l a y e dw i t h i ne a c hf r a m e .I nt h i sc a s e ,w ea c c e p tt h en u l lh y p o t h e s i s
of no diﬀerence in behavior across frames at a 10% conﬁdence level.
PLAYERS P0 P1 P2 P3
1 .04 .87 .09 .06 .11 .83 .03 .09 .88 .01 .01 .98
2 .05 .92 .03 .09 .59 .32 0 1 0 .01 .11 .88
3 .15 .81 .04 .99 0 .01 .77 .13 .1 .77 .16 .01
RULES cea p cel cea p cel cea p cel cea p cel
(6)
Table 6: Aggregate behavior in the unframed sessions
We now move to subjects’ behavior in the two unframed sessions, as re-
ported in Table 6. Here we notice that the pivotal players choose their weakly
dominant strategies with a frequency even higher than in the framed sessions.
17In the remainder of this section, we shall measure signiﬁcance by way of standard χ2
statistics.
17In particular, in P2, player 2 selects the proportional rule all the time, in clear
contrast with the framed sessions. However, while for all procedures pivotal
players’ initial play in the unframed sessions is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
that of the framed sessions, if we consider the last 10 periods only, this is
true only for P2 (that is, the procedures that displays a higher variability in
behavior).
As far as the weakly dominant strategy used by non-pivotal players, we
notice that, the weakly dominant action is selected always more than 75% of
the times.18 This frequency is higher than in the framed sessions. However,
while in the framed sessions non-pivotal players increased these frequencies
throughout each session, the opposite occurs in the unframed sessions.
As for P0, subjects choose the proportional rule with a relative frequency























RULES cea p cel
(7)
Table 7: Table 6 disaggregated for periods in P0.
Again, we observe that behavior in the unframed sessions is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from that of the framed sessions only in the beginning, not if we
consider the last ten repetitions only.
To summarize, we could say that subjects behave diﬀerently, depending
on the particular frame considered (this frame eﬀect being stronger in P2).
Notwithstanding, these diﬀerences vanish in the last repetitions of the game
and do not aﬀect rule distributions.
18More precisely, Player 1 chooses rule C, 83.12% and 88.12% of the times in P1 and P2,
respectively. Surprisingly, these percentages decreased to 78.75% and 85% in the last 10
periods. Player 3 chooses rule A, 76.87% and 77.5% of the times in P2 and P3, respectively.
These percentages again decreased to 71.25% and 73.75% in the last 10 periods.
19The number in the bottom-left (top-right) corner corresponds to the ﬁr s t( l a s t )t e n
periods.
185C o n c l u s i o n
Our experimental study provides clear-cut answers to the questions we posed
in the introduction.
• “In Game 3 everything was determined by my own choice.”20
First, we found that subjects recognized, since the very ﬁrst periods,
the strategic features of procedures P1, P2 and P3 and reacted accordingly.
For these games, convergence takes place since the very beginning. This is
far more evident for pivotal players, those who could force the outcome in
their favor by selecting their weakly dominant strategies. In this respect,
our evidence conﬁrms that compliance with equilibrium is high (in our case,
practically full) in normal-form games that are solvable with one round of
deletion of weakly dominated strategies.21
• “First, I was trying the way to maximize my payoﬀ, then I realized that
t h i sw a sn o tp o s s i b l e ,s i n c ee v e r y b o d yw a sa c t i n gt h es a m ew a ya n dw e
were all loosing money. So, we settled on an intermediate solution,
which was not the best for me, but as not the worst either.”22
In stark contrast with the evidence above, in the coordination procedure
P0, subjects unanimously agreed to solve the bankruptcy problem by way
of the proportional rule. The reason why they behave this way could be
twofold. First, because of the fact that the proportional outcome lies in
between the cea and the cel outcomes. As a consequence, the proportional
rule provides with the second best outcome for both the highest and the
smallest claimants, and with the best outcome for the intermediate claimant,
while both the constrained equal awards and the constrained equal losses are
associated to the worst possible outcome for either the highest and the lowest
claimants, respectively. It seems then natural that agents coordinate at the
intermediate outcome. Clearly, this median voter eﬀect is speciﬁco fo u r
experimental deign, and we expect our result to be diﬀerent varying the claim
distribution (for example, considering a bankruptcy problem in which there
is a single majority of small claimants). This consideration notwithstanding,
20Debrieﬁng section of Session 7 (unframed). Subject # 4 (player 1).
21See Costa-Gomes et al. [5]
22Debrieﬁng section of Session 1 (framed). Subject # 9 (player 3).
19our experiment suggests that optimal bankruptcy rule may depend on claim
distributions (an aspect completely neglected by the axiomatic literature),
and that a key feature of an optimal rule to be its immunity to strategic
manipulation. In this respect De Frutos [10] shows that the proportional
rule is the unique rule that meets this condition.
• “I took the most equitative choice for the three of us.”23
Finally, we suspect that fairness considerations may also have enhanced
the coordination power of the proportional rule. The reason why the propor-
tional rule (as opposed to cea or cel) was clearly identiﬁed as the fair rule
to be applied to the problem at stake is left for future research.
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216 Appendix. The Instructions
We only present here the instructions of Session 1 and Session 7. The re-
maining sessions go along the same lines, except for some diﬀerences that are
introduced in footnotes.
Instructions of a Framed Session (Session 1)
Sfuhhq 1: Whofrph wr wkh E{shulphqw
This is an experiment to study how people interact in a bankrupt sit-
uation. We are only interested in what people do on average and keep no
record at all of how our individual subjects behave. Please do not feel that
any particular behavior is expected from you.
On the other hand, keep also in mind that your behavior will aﬀect the
sum of money you may win during the course of this experiment.
On the following pages you will ﬁnd a series of instructions explaining how
the experiment works and how to use the computer during the experiment.
HELP: When you are ready to continue, please click on the OK button
Sfuhhq 2: Hrz |rx fdq pdnh prqh|
• You will be playing two sessions of 20 rounds each. In each round, for
all sessions, you and other two persons in this room will be assigned to
aG R O U P .I ne a c hr o u n d ,e a c hp e r s o ni nt h eg r o u pw i l lh a v et om a k e
a decision. Your decision (and the decision of the other two persons in
your group) will determine how much money you (and the other) win
for that round.
• At the beginning of each round, the computer will select at random the
composition of your group.
• Remember that the composition of your group WILL CHANGE AT
EVERY ROUND.
• To begin, you will receive 1000 pesetas just for participating in this
experiment.24 Moreover, at the beginning of each session, an initial
endowment of 1000 pesetas will be given to you.
24This sentence did not appear in the case of Player 3.
22• Note that the computer has assigned you a number of PLAYER (1, 2 or
3). This number appears at the right of your screen and will represent
your type of player. There are three types of players: player 1, player
2 and player 3. Every group will be always composed by three players
from diﬀe r e n tt y p e s . R e m e m b e rt h a ty o uw i l lb et h es a m et y p eo f
player along the experiment.
• In each round, you will have to pay some of this money, depending
on your action and those of the persons in your group. The sum of
the amounts you pay in each round, will be subtracted to your ini-
tial endowment and will constitute your TOTAL payoﬀ in this session.
Remember that payoﬀsi nt h i se x p e r i m e n ta r es u c ht h a tI NA L LC I R -
CUMSTANCES YOU WILL WIN MONEY.
• At the end of the experiment you will receive the TOTAL sum of money
you obtained in each session, plus the show-up fee of 1000 pesetas25
HELP: When you are ready to continue, please click on the OK button.
Sfuhhq 3: Tkh Fluvw Gdph (I)
There is a bank which goes bankrupt. A judge must decide how its liquida-
t i o nv a l u es h o u l db ea l l o c a t e da m o n gt h eb a n k ’ sc r e d i t o r s .I nt h i se x p e r i m e n t
you (and all other persons participating to the experiment) are creditors who
go to the court.
In this session, the bank’s creditors are all depositors,26 that is, people
who have money saved in the bank. You have to come to an agreement with
the other depositors in your group on how much of the estate should be given
to each of you. Clearly (since the bank has gone bankrupt) the sum of all
claims, i.e. the sum of your deposits, is greater than the available estate.
In each round, you need to guarantee as much as possible of your claim,
which will determine your loss (the diﬀerence between your claim and the
amount you receive) in each round. The sum of these losses will be subtracted
to your initial endowment and will constitute your TOTAL payoﬀ in this
session.
25In the case of Player 3: At the end of the experiment you will receive the TOTAL sum
of money you obtained in each session.
26This is the case of Frame 1, which corresponds to P1. In the case of Frame 2 (3) it is
said shareholders (non-governmental organizations which are, at least, partially, supported
by the bank) instead of depositors.
23Concerning the problem involving you and the other two persons in your





The estate is 20.
As you can observe, there is no enough liquidation value to satisfy all claims.
Remember that the player number assigned to you (1, 2 or 3) appears on
the computer screen and remains ﬁxed throughout the experiment.
Among the diﬀerent options on how the liquidation value of the bank
should be distributed, the judge has decided that you can only choose among
the following rules:
1. RULE A, that divides the estate equally among the creditors under the
condition in which no one gets more than her claim. In other words,
this rule beneﬁts the agent with the lowest claim.
2. RULE B, that divides the estate proportionally to claims.
3. RULE C, which makes losses as equal as possible, among creditors,
subject to the condition that all agents receive something non-negative
from the estate. In other words, this rule beneﬁts the agent with the
highest claim.
Concerning the problem involving you and the other two persons in your
group, the allocations corresponding to each rule are the following:
A ≡ (7.5,7.5,5); B ≡ (9.8,9.2,1); C ≡ (11.5,8.5,0).
For instance, rule B divides the estate in three parts, assigning 9.8 to player
1, 9.2 to player 2 and 1 to player 3.
Sfuhhq 4: Tkh Fluvw Gdph (II)
T h es t r u c t u r eo ft h eg a m ei sa sf o l l o w s :
24Your decision, and the decisions of the members of your group will deter-
mine the division of the estate, as it is shown in the payoﬀ matrices. Note
that if you all agree on the same rule, then the division of the estate is exactly
the one you propose.
This is how to read the matrices. There are three tables with nine cells
each: player 1 chooses the row, player 2 chooses the column and player 3
chooses the table. Each cell contains three numbers. The ﬁrst number tells
how much money player 1 looses if that cell is selected, the second number
tells how much money player 2 looses and the third number tells how much
money player 3 looses. For instance, consider the upper left cell. This cell
is selected when every player chooses rule A. Therefore, the division of the
estate is the one that rule A proposes, i.e. (7.5,7.5,5). As a consequence of
this, and taking into account the above claims, player 1 looses 7.5 − 49 =
−41.5,w h i c hi st h eﬁrst number of that particular cell. Similarly, player 2
looses 7.5 − 46 = −38.5, and player 3 looses 5 − 5=0.
To summarize,
• You will be playing 20 times with changing components.
• At the beginning of each round, the computer selects your group at
random;
• In each round, you and the other two persons in your group must
choose one among the three available rules A, B and C. Your choice
(and the choices of the other two persons in your group) will determine
how much money will be subtracted to your initial endowment, as it is
shown in the corresponding table in front of you.
H E L P :T oc h o o s ea na c t i o n ,y o us i m p l yh a v et oc l i c ko nt h ec o r r e s p o n d i n g
letter. Once you have done that, please conﬁrm your choice by clicking the
OK button.
Sfuhhq 5: Tkh Shfrqg Gdph.
Now, you are going to play 20 additional rounds of the following game. As
before, in this session, the bank’s creditors are all depositors,27 that is, people
27This is the case of Frame 1. In the case of Frame 2 (3) it is said shareholders (non-
governmental organizations which are, at least, partially, supported by the bank)i n s t e a d
of depositors.
25who have money saved in the bank. You can observe from your computer
screen that the claims of each player and the estate do not change.
As before, you have to come to an agreement with the other depositors
in your group on how much of the estate should be given to each of you.
Remember, as before, that 1000 pesetas were assigned to you at the beginning
of the session.
The instructions are the same as in the previous game with some slight
modiﬁcations. In each round, as before, you have to choose among rules A,
B and C. If you all agree on the same rule, in your group, then the division
of the estate is exactly the one you propose. If only two of you agree on
a rule then, those who agree get the share proposed by that rule and the
creditor who does not agree in the division, not only looses her whole claim,
but also pays a ﬁxed penalty of 1 peseta Finally, if all of you disagree on the
proposed shares, then all of you loose your claim and pay the ﬁxed penalty of
1 peseta The corresponding allocations to each possible situation are shown
in the payoﬀ matrices below.
The matrices are read exactly as before. For instance, consider the lower
left cell. This cell is selected when players 2 and 3 chooses A and player 1
chooses C. In this particular case, player 1 looses −1 − 49 = −50,w h i c hi s
the upper number of that particular cell. Similarly, player 2 looses 7.5−46 =
−38.5, and player 3 looses 5 − 5=0 .
H E L P :T oc h o o s ea na c t i o n ,y o us i m p l yh a v et oc l i c ko nt h ec o r r e s p o n d i n g
letter. Once you have done that, please conﬁrm your choice by clicking the
OK button.
26Instructions of an Unframed Session (Sessions 7 and 8)
Sfuhhq 1: Whofrph wr wkh E{shulphqw
This is an experiment to study how people interact. We are only inter-
e s t e di nw h a tp e o p l ed oo na v e r a g ea n dk e e pn or e c o r da ta l lo fh o wo u r
individual subjects behave. Please do not feel that any particular behavior
is expected from you.
On the other hand, keep also in mind that your behavior will aﬀect the
sum of money you may win during the course of this experiment.
On the following pages you will ﬁnd a series of instructions explaining how
the experiment works and how to use the computer during the experiment.
HELP: When you are ready to continue, please click on the OK button
Sfuhhq 2: Hrz |rx fdq pdnh prqh|
• You will be playing four sessions of 20 rounds each. In each round, for
all sessions, you and other two persons in this room will be assigned to
aG R O U P .I ne a c hr o u n d ,e a c hp e r s o ni nt h eg r o u pw i l lh a v et om a k e
a decision. Your decision (and the decision of the other two persons in
your group) will determine how much money you (and the other) win
for that round.
• At the beginning of each round, the computer will select at random the
composition of your group.
• Remember that the composition of your group WILL CHANGE AT
EVERY ROUND.
• To begin, you will receive 1000 pesetas just for participating in this
experiment.28 Moreover, at the beginning of each session, an initial
endowment of 1000 pesetas will be given to you.
• Note that the computer has assigned you a number of PLAYER (1, 2 or
3). This number appears at the right of your screen and will represent
your type of player. There are three types of players: player 1, player
2 and player 3. Every group will be always composed by three players
from diﬀe r e n tt y p e s . R e m e m b e rt h a ty o uw i l lb et h es a m et y p eo f
player along the experiment.
28This sentence was not included in the case of Player 3.
27• In each round, you will have to pay some of this money, depending
on your action and those of the persons in your group. The sum of
the amounts you pay in each round, will be subtracted to your ini-
tial endowment and will constitute your TOTAL payoﬀ in this session.
Remember that payoﬀsi nt h i se x p e r i m e n ta r es u c ht h a tI NA L LC I R -
CUMSTANCES YOU WILL WIN MONEY.
• At the end of the experiment you will receive the TOTAL sum of money
you obtained in each session, plus the show-up fee of 1000 pesetas29
HELP: When you are ready to continue, please click on the OK button.
Sfuhhq 3: Tkh Fluvw Gdph.30
At the beginning of each round, the computer will select randomly the
composition of your group.
In each round, you and the other two members of your group, must choose
among three possible decisions: A, B and C.
Your decision, and the decisions of the members of your group will deter-
mine the how much money you will lose from your initial endowment in this
session, as it is shown in the payoﬀ matrices.
This is how to read the matrices. There are three tables with nine cells
each: player 1 chooses the row, player 2 chooses the column and player 3
chooses the table. Each cell contains three numbers. The ﬁrst number tells
how much money player 1 looses if that cell is selected, the second number
tells how much money player 2 looses and the third number tells how much
money player 3 looses.
For instance, consider the lower left cell. This cell is selected when every
player 1 chooses C and players 2 and 3 choose A. Therefore, player 1 loses
−41.5,w h i c hi st h eﬁrst number of that particular cell. Similarly, player 2
loses −38.5, and player 3 loses 5 − 5=0 .
To summarize,
• You will be playing 20 times with changing components.
29In the case of Player 3: At the end of the experiment you will receive the TOTAL sum
of money you obtained in each session.
30This was the third game in Session 8.
28• At the beginning of each round, the computer selects your group at
random;
• Remember that your player number (1, 2 or 3) will keep constant
throughout the experiment.
• In each round, you and the other two persons in your group must
choose one among the three available rules A, B and C. Your choice
(and the choices of the other two persons in your group) will determine
how much money will be subtracted to your initial endowment, as it is
shown in the corresponding table in front of you.
H E L P :T oc h o o s ea na c t i o n ,y o us i m p l yh a v et oc l i c ko nt h ec o r r e s p o n d i n g




































































































































































































































































































































































































C7T a b l e s


























































RULES cea p cel cea p cel cea p cel
(8)


























































RULES cea p cel cea p cel cea p cel
(9)


























































RULES cea p cel cea p cel cea p cel
(10)
Table 10: Table 6 disaggregated for periods